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CREDITOR AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
by
Vernon 0. Teofan * and Jeanne E. O'Neill**
HIS Article surveys significant developments under Texas law for the
period beginning October 1987 through December 1988 in the areas
of creditor and consumer rights. During the Survey period, the
Texas courts decided a number of usury and consumer credit cases worthy
of note. In addition, this Article highlights several important changes re-
garding exempt property under Texas law.
I. USURY
During the Survey period the Texas Supreme Court rendered two interest-
ing usury decisions. In Seiter v. Veytia I the court held that the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA)2
does not preempt state law with respect to a usury claim arising from late
charges in a loan secured by a first lien on residential real property.3 In
Steve's Sash & Door Co. v. Ceco Corp.4 the court applied the implied defini-
tion of the term "principal" for purposes of the forfeiture provision under
the Texas usury statute in the context of a suit on a sworn account.5 In
Seiter the dispute arose from the sale of residential real property by the
Seiters to the Veytias in July 1981, after the effective date of DIDMCA. As
evidence of the purchase price the Veytias executed two promissory notes
payable to the Seiters. The Veytias secured the notes with deeds of trust on
the subject property. In 1984 the parties modified the original agreements.
Under the modified agreement, the Veytias contracted for the payment of
late charges amounting to $20 per day for each day that any installment was
past due. Thereafter, the Seiters instituted nonjudicial foreclosure proceed-
ings upon the Veytias' default under the modified agreement.
In response to the foreclosure notice, the Veytias filed suit for injunctive
relief and damages, alleging that the late charges constituted usurious inter-
* B.A., J.D., University of Notre Dame. Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C.,
Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Siena College; J.D., Hofstra University. Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist,
P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. 756 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1988).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 96 Stat. 132 (1980). Title V of the Act deals with state usury
laws. Title V, § 501 (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1980)).
3. 756 S.W.2d at 305.
4. 751 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 1988).
5. Id. at 475.
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est under Texas law.6 The Seiters moved for summary judgment on the the-
ory that DIDMCA preempted state law limitations on interest on loans
secured by first liens on residential real property. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Seiters.7 On appeal the San Antonio
court of appeals held that DIDMCA did not preempt usurious late charges
and reversed and remanded the case for trial.8 The Texas Supreme Court
took up the case with a writ of error. 9
First, the Texas Supreme Court held that since Texas did not explicitly
opt out of DIDMCA, that federal law applied to the modified agreement in
the case at bar.10 Next, the court examined the legislative history to
DIDMCA and determined that Congress did not intend the federal law to
preempt state limitations on late charges or similar borrower protections. I"
Finally, the court considered the Seiters' argument that since Texas law
characterizes late charges as interest and therefore these late charges are sub-
ject to the federal preemption relative to the annual percentage rate.12 The
court rejected this argument because the federal definition of interest is lim-
ited to the annual percentage rate.' 3 Based upon the foregoing, the Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals to remand the
usury claim to the trial court for disposition.14
In Steve's Sash & Door the controversy arose from the credit sale of doors
by Steve's Sash and Door Company to the Ceco Corporation at a total
purchase price of $71,702.95. Steve's Sash delivered the doors and invoiced
Ceco in several installments. Each invoice that Steve's Sash issued to Ceco
provided for a thirty-day grace period before interest would begin to accrue
on the outstanding balance. Ceco paid only a portion of the purchase price
and Steve's Sash bought a suit on a sworn account to collect the unpaid
balance. At the time Steve's Sash filed the suit, Ceco had already paid in-
voices amounting to $41,796.80 upon which Steve's Sash charged no inter-
est, and a $13,454.70 invoice upon which Steve's Sash charged $245.69
interest. Ceco filed a counterclaim, alleging that Steve's Sash had engaged in
6. The Veytias based their claim on the interest protection provisions in Texas statutes.
TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 to .09 (Vernon 1987). They also requested forfei-
ture of principal, attorneys' fees, and other penalties under id. art. 5069-1.06(1).
7. See 756 S.W.2d at 304.
8. 740 S.W.2d 64, 66-67 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987), aff'd, 751 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.
1988).
9. 756 S.W.2d at 303.
10. Id. at 304-05.
11. Id. at 305. "In exempting mortgage loans from state usury limitations, the committee
intends to exempt only those limitations that are included in the annual percentage rate. The
committee does not intend to exempt limitations on prepayment charges, attorneys' fees, late
charges or similar limitations designed to protect borrowers." Id. (emphasis by the court)
(quoting S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 236, 255).
12. 756 S.W.2d at 305. The Seiters relied upon Dixon v. Brooks, 604 S.W.2d 330, 333
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Watson v. Cargill, Inc., 573
S.W.2d 35, 42 (Tex. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
13. 756 S.W.2d at 305.
14. Id.
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usurious credit practices because Steve's Sash charged Ceco interest on the
$13,454.70 invoice during the contractual grace period.
Following a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment for Steve's Sash on
the sworn account, and in addition awarded Steve's Sash attorney's fees,
costs, and post-judgment interest. The court also rendered a take-nothing
judgment on Ceco's usury counterclaim. On appeal the San Antonio court
of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Ceco on the usury counter-
claim, granting Ceco prejudgment interest on its awarded damages. 15 More-
over, the appellate court reversed the judgment for Steve's Sash on the sworn
account and held that Steve's Sash had forfeited the entire principal balance
of the account, including the invoices upon which it charged no interest. 16
Steve's Sash appealed to the Texas Supreme Court for a writ of error as-
serting that the court of appeals should limit the forfeiture of principal to the
$13,454.70 invoice upon which it charged Ceco interest and should not ap-
ply the forfeiture to the entire purchase price. The court granted the writ of
error and held that, for the limited purposes of applying the forfeiture provi-
sion of the usury statute, the term "principal" consisted of only the amount
upon which the creditor charged the debtor usurious interest. 17 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that Steve's Sash
should forfeit only the principal sum of $13,454.70 and not the entire
purchase price.1 8 Moreover, the court reinstated the jury verdict for Steve's
Sash on the sworn account and allowed an offset of the judgment against the
usury penalties. 19
The Texas Supreme Court further held that the court of appeals had erred
in awarding prejudgment interest to Ceco on its usury claim because the
exclusive penalties for usury set forth in the usury statute do not include
prejudgment interest. 20 The court also concluded that an award of prejudg-
ment interest to usury victims would not serve any valid policy objectives. 2'
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the procedural attacks of both
parties.2 2
The Texas courts of appeal also decided several usury cases dealing with
15. Ceco Corp. v. Steve's Sash & Door Co., 714 S.W.2d 322, 328 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1986), rev'd, 751 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 1988).
16. Id. The Texas statute provides that where the usurious interest amounts to more than
double the maximum lawful interest, the principal amount of the debt is forfeited. TEX. REv.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1987).
17. 751 S.W.2d at 475. The court noted that the usury statute does not define the term
"principal." Id. The statute however, defines the term "interest" as "the compensation al-
lowed by law for the use or forbearance or detention of money." Id. The court considered
these two terms as synergistic words that taken together result in a definition of "principal" as
"that amount which is used, forborne, or detained, and upon which the interest is charge." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 476. The verdict of $16.451.45 for Steve's Sash offsets the $2,000.00 penalty
under art. 5069-1.06(1) and the $13,454.70 penalty under art. 5059-1.06(2), resulting in a net
recovery to Steve's Sash of $996.75. Id.
20. Id., see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1987).
21. 751 S.W.2d at 476. The court distinguished cases sounding in tort in which an award
of prejudgment interest reimburses the victim for the lost use of money or compensation for an
injury. Id. (citing Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985)).
22. 751 S.W.2d at 477.
1989]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
such diverse issues as the bona fide error defense, 23 the inapplicability of the
usury statute to lease agreements, 24 and the acceleration of a wraparound
note secured by a deed of trust.25 In Martinez v. Corpus Christi Area Teach-
ers' Credit Union 26 the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that the bona
fide error defense, once established, prevented the imposition of a penalty for
usurious interest. 27 In August 1981 the Martinezes signed a promissory note
payable to the credit union in the sum of $4,900.00.28 The promissory note
stated that interest would accrue at ".49315 percent per day, an Annual Per-
centage Rate of 18 percent."'29 Thereafter, in August 1985, the Martinezes
filed suit against the credit union, alleging that the note was usurious and
that the credit union was negligent in the note preparation and the disposi-
tion of the vehicle that secured the original loan. In October 1985 the credit
union sued the Martinezes to collect the unpaid balance of the note, alleging
default.
Following consolidation of the matters for trial, the credit union filed mo-
tions for summary judgment on its claim against the Martinezes and its af-
firmative defense of bona fide error to the Martinezes' usury claim. The
credit union alleged in its motions that the excessive per diem rate set forth
in the note was the result of a clerical error. The credit union asserted that
the intended interest rate was .049315 per diem as evidenced by the annual
percentage rate stated in both the note and the payment schedule. The
credit union further asserted that the applicable statute of limitations had
run on the negligence claims. The trial court granted both motions for sum-
mary judgment in favor of the credit union and the Martinezes appealed.
The Corpus Christi court of appeal held that it would determine whether
the rate of interest was usurious on the basis of the payment schedule set
forth in the note, regardless of the stated per diem rate. 30 The court also
considered the note to be ambiguous on its face since two provisions (the
annual percentage rate and the payment schedule) called for 18 percent in-
terest per annum but a third provision (the per diem rate provision) called
for 180 percent per annum. 31 Based on its findings, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's holding that the note was not usurious as a matter
23. Martinez v. Corpus Christi Area Teachers' Credit Unions, 758 S.W.2d 946 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ ref'd n.r.c.).
24. Potomac Leasing Co. v. Housing Auth., 743 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987,
writ dism'd).
25. Greenland Vistas, Inc. v. Plantation Place Assocs., 746 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1988, n.w.h.).
26. 758 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ ref'd).
27. Id. at 950.
28. This sum represented the amount of a deficiency remaining after the credit union
repossessed and sold the vehicle that the Martinezes purchased on credit. While in the credit
union's possession the vehicle was allegedly vandalized and brought much less than the bal-
ance of the car loan at the foreclosure sale.
29. The stated per diem rate of .49315 amounts to an annual percentage rate of 180 per-
cent. The note specifically provided for payments of 1 I installments of $100.00 each and a
final balloon payment of $4,654.40. Thus, the total amount that the Martinezes would be
required to pay under the note was $5,754.40 on the original principal balance of $4,900.00.
30. 758 S.W.2d at 950.
31. Id.
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of law.32
With respect to the bona fide error defense, the Corpus Christi court of
appeals accepted the credit union's unrefuted evidence of a clerical mistake
in the per diem rate and upheld the lower court's decision that the defense
was valid as a matter of law. 33 The court also affirmed the denial of relief to
the Martinezes on their contract and tort claims against the credit union
because the statute of limitations had run.3 4
In Potomac Leasing Co. v. Housing Authority35 the controversy concerned
the applicability of the usury statute to the subject lease agreement. The
Housing Authority had leased a copy machine at a cost of $850 per month,
but after experiencing difficulties with the copier, the Housing Authority
stopped making the lease payments. Potomac then repossessed the copier
and filed suit in Michigan to recover damages for breach of the lease, includ-
ing late charges of $795.60 and interest of $612.36. The Housing Authority
countered by commencing suit in an El Paso court alleging usury, fraud, and
deceptive trade practices under Texas law based upon the late charges and
interest claimed in the Michigan pleading. The El Paso trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of the Housing Authority on the usury claim
and severed the remaining causes of action for trial. Potomac appealed the
summary judgment on the grounds that the transaction was not subject to
Texas usury law. 36
On appeal the court in Potomac Leasing noted that a nonusurious loan
agreement may give rise to a usury claim where the collection efforts include
charges of excessive interest or late fees. 37 The appellate court next consid-
ered whether the same rule applied to collection efforts relative to a lease
transaction and concluded that it did not, unless the lease was a disguised
credit transaction. 38 In so holding, the court of appeals determined that the
usury statute39 applies only to lending transactions; thus, a bona fide lease is
excluded from the scope of the usury statute.4° Accordingly, the court re-
versed the summary judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court.
In Greenland Vistas, Inc. v. Plantation Place Associates 41 the Fort Worth
court of appeals decided that the acceleration of a purchase money wrap-
32. Id.
33. Id. at 951.
34. Id. at 952.
35. 743 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ dism'd).
36. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01 to .06 (Vernon 1987).
37. 743 S.W.2d at 713 (citing Danziger v. San Jacinto Sav. Ass'n, 732 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.
1987) and cases cited in Dryden v. City Nat'l Bank, 666 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
38. Id. Holley v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1982) ("The essential elements of a usuri-
ous transaction are: (1) a loan of money; (2) an absolute obligation that the principal be re-
paid; and (3) the exaction of greater compensation than allowed by law for the use of the
money by the borrower." (citation omitted)); Transamerican Leasing Co. v. Three Bears, Inc.,
586 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1979) (lease-purchase agreements are covered by usury statute)).
39. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01 to .06 (Vernon 1987).
40. Id. The statute implement arts. XVI, § I 1 of the Texas Constitution, which neither
expressly nor impliedly covers lease transactions. 743 S.W.2d at 713 (citing Maloney v. An-
drews, 483 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland, 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
41. 746 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 1988, n.w.h.).
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around note secured by a deed of trust did not constitute a charge of usuri-
ous interest when the interest demanded was based upon the entire
outstanding principal balance of the debt, including the underlying lien. 42
The controversy arose from the sale of an apartment project from Greenland
Vistas to Plantation Place. The parties financed the project by means of a
cash down payment and the execution of a purchase money wrap note in the
original principal amount of $2,707,433.96. The wrap note included an un-
derlying indebtedness with a balance of $2,704,830.19 at the time of the sale.
Subsequent to the sale, Plantation Place stopped making payments and
Greenland Vistas accelerated the indebtedness and commenced foreclosure
proceedings on the property.43 Plantation Place then filed suit to enjoin the
foreclosure and recover statutory penalties based on alleged usury
violations.4
Following a nonjury trial, the district court ruled that the acceleration
demand constituted a usurious charge of interest under article 5069-1.01 of
the usury statute.4 5 The trial court enjoined the foreclosure sale and
awarded judgment to Plantation Place in the sum of $1,350,453.53 with in-
terest at a rate of ten percent per annum 46
The Fort Worth court of appeals in Greenland Vistas examined the unique
nature of a wraparound mortgage and determined that the usury issue raised
by Plantation Place was dependent on the parties' intent as evidenced by the
loan documents. 4 7 In the instant case, the transaction involved a sale of
property rather than a loan of money. Plantation Place obtained the full use
and benefit of the realty at the time of the sale and the benefit of the underly-
ing debt. Reading all of the debt instruments together to establish the intent
of the parties, the court included the underlying indebtedness in the amount
owed by Plantation Place to Greenland Vistas and held that the acceleration
and demand was not usurious.4 8 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial
court's judgment and rendered a take nothing judgment, charging costs to
Plantation Place.49
42. Id. at 927.
43. In connection with the acceleration, Greenland Vistas demanded payment of
$2,944,654.51, calculated to be the outstanding balance of the wrap note (including the under-
lying lien) with accrued interest.
44. Plantation Place argued that interest was properly chargeable only on the difference
between the wrap note and the underlying debt.
45. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01, .06 (Vernon 1987).
46. The court rendered judgment against Greenland Vistas, Inc. and Louis M. Stoler, the
substitute trustee under the wraparound mortgage. 746 S.W.2d at 923.
47. Id. at 925 (citing Consolidated Capital Special Trust v. Summers, 737 S.W.2d 327
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ)).
48. Id. at 927. The court reviewed the transaction documents and recited that:
(1) Plantation Place . . . in partial consideration [of the real estate purchase]
delivered a $2,707,433.96 wrap note to Greenland Vistas; (2) the face amount of
the note included a prior lien indebtedness; (3) in order to convey free and clear
title of the property, Greenland Vistas undertook, but did not assume, to pay the
underlying obligations out of the payments received from Plantation Place; and
(4) Plantation Place took the property subject to these underlying liens and
upon acceleration would be liable for the underlying lien balance.
49. Id.
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II. CONSUMER CREDIT AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
During the Survey period, Texas courts rendered several noteworthy deci-
sions dealing with deceptive trade practices and consumer credit. Specifi-
cally, the Texas courts examined whether constructive notice barred a
plaintiff's claims for fraud and deceptive trade practices; 50 whether the elec-
tion of equitable relief precluded recovery of exemplary damages;51 and
whether a borrower was a consumer entitled to bring an action against a
lender for deceptive trade practices. 52
In Ojeda de Toca v. Wise5 3 the Texas Supreme Court determined that
despite constructive notice of the alleged defects based on the real estate
recording statutes, 54 an aggrieved purchaser could maintain a cause of ac-
tion against the seller under the Deceptive Trade Practice Act (DTPA) 55 for
damages arising from the sale of real property. 56 The issue arose when Wise
Developments sold a house to Mrs. de Toca that was subject to a recorded
demolition order. After the city of Houston demolished the house, Mrs. de
Toca sued Wise Developments, William J. Wise, and others on the basis of
deceptive trade practices, fraud, and negligence.
57
At trial the jury found that Wise had actual knowledge of the demolition
order and withheld the information from Mrs. de Toca in order to procure
the sale. The jury also found that Mrs. de Toca would not have purchased
the property had Wise disclosed the existence of the demolition order. The
trial court entered judgment against Wise Developments and Wise individu-
ally (hereinafter referred to jointly as "Wise") for fraud and DTPA
violations.58
In a decision discussed in last year's Survey article, 59 the Houston court of
appeals reversed the trial court's decision against Wise based upon construc-
tive notice.60 The appellate court held as a matter of law that recordation of
the demolition order in the Harris County deed records operated as a bar to
the DTPA and fraud claims. 61
The Texas Supreme Court in Ojeda de Toca reviewed the applicable statu-
tory provisions and concluded that the jury findings clearly established a
cause of action against Wise under DTPA sections 17.50(a)(1) and
50. Ojeda de Toca v. Wise, 748 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1988).
51. Consolidated Tex. Fin. v. Shearer, 739 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987,
writ ref'd).
52. Holland Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Bone, 751 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-Houston [st
Dist.] 1987, no writ).
53. 748 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1988).
54. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.002 (Vernon 1984).
55. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (Vernon 1987).
56. 748 S.W.2d at 451.
57. Two title companies named as defendants in the suit settled with Mrs. de Toca and
were not parties to this appeal.
58. The trial court also rendered judgment against the title companies for negligence.
59. Teofan & O'Neill, Creditor and Consumer Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42
Sw. L.J. 208 (1988).
60. 733 S.W.2d 325, 327-28 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987). The appellate court
reversed judgment against the title companies on other grounds. Id. at 327.
61. Id. at 328.
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17.46(b)(23). 62 As a result the court determined that Mrs. de Toca was enti-
tled to recovery against Wise unless he could establish a defense to the
DTPA and fraud claims. The Ojeda de Toca court next reviewed the case
law cited by the appellate court63 and expressly rejected the dictum that
record notice serves as a defense to a claim arising under the DTPA.64 The
court noted that the legislature's intent in enacting the recording statute65
was to protect the good faith purchaser's title to real property from the im-
position of secret grants and liens not to bar the purchaser's DTPA or fraud
claims. 66 Moreover, the court noted that the Texas courts historically had
allowed fraud claims arising from real property transactions notwithstand-
ing constructive notice afforded by the deed records. 67 Based upon the fore-
going, the Texas Supreme Court determined that notice imputed under the
recording statute would not operate as a defense to Mrs. de Toca's DTPA
claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeals' decision and
remanded the matter for appropriate disposition.
In Consolidated Texas Financial v. Shearer68 the Fort Worth court of ap-
peals reviewed a DTPA judgment that granted punitive damages to a plain-
tiff who had elected equitable relief instead of actual damages. The case
arose from the foreclosure of a mechanics' and materialmen's lien upon the
Shearers' residence. The Shearers sued the lienholder, Consolidated Texas
Financial, 69 and Texas Insulators, alleging violations of the Texas Home So-
licitation Transaction Act, the DTPA, and the Credit Code in connection
with the purchase of storm windows and doors from Texas Insulators.70 Af-
ter a jury trial the Shearers elected the equitable remedy of voiding the fore-
62. 748 S.W.2d at 450. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1) (Vernon 1987) pro-
vides redress to consumers sustaining damages as a result of trade practices set forth in
§ 17.46(b). The latter section proscribes, among other things, "the failure to disclose informa-
tion concerning goods or services which was known at the time of the transaction if such
failure to disclose such information was intended to induce the consumer into a transaction
into which the consumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed." Id.
§ 17.46(b)(23).
63. The appellate court relied upon Medallion Homes, Inc. v. Thermar Invs., Inc., 698
S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); and Jernigan v. Page, 662
S.W.2d 760 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (judgment sustained on no
evidence ground).
64. 748 S.W.2d at 450.
, 65. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.002 (Vernon 1984).
66. 748 S.W.2d at 450-51 (citing 66 AM. JUR. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 48
(1973)).
67. Id. at 451, (citing Graham v. Roder, 5 Tex. 141, 147 (Tex. 1849); Buchanan v. Bur-
nett, 102 Tex. 492, 119 S.W. 1141 (Tex. 1909); Boucher v. Wallis, 236 S.W.2d 519, 526 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540
comment b (1977)). The court also distinguished Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982), and NRC, Inc. v. Pickhardt, 667 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), since title was not at issue in the Ojeda de Toca case.
68. 739 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987 writ ref'd).
69. Texas Insulators originally held the foreclosed installment contract and lien, but as-
signed them to Consolidated Texas Financial, a related entity.
70. The Shearers' specific complaints included failure to provide the Shearers with a copy
of the retail installment contract, omission of the statutory rescission notice from the contract,
backdating of the contract, and misrepresentations concerning the consequences of the lien on
the home.
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closure sale and quieting title to their home. 71 In addition, the trial court
granted punitive damages in the sum of $20,000 pursuant to the jury
findings.
Texas Insulators appealed the judgment of the trial court, asserting that
the Shearers' election of equitable relief precluded an award of exemplary
damages. Alternatively, Texas Insulators contended that the punitive award
was disproportionate to the actual damages found by the jury. On appeal
the court noted that when assessing punitive damages, a court should direct
its attention towards the defendant's conduct and not to the nature or
amount of the plaintiff's damages, 72 because the purposes of exemplary
damages are to punish the wrongdoer and to deter similar conduct. 73 In the
instant case, the court of appeals said that the degree of the defendant's mis-
conduct clearly warranted punitive measures and the plaintiffs established
that they sustained verifiable injury. The court of appeals then ruled that the
Shearers' choice of equitable relief did not preclude the award of exemplary
damages.74 Furthermore, the court held that the amount of the exemplary
damages was reasonable in light of the actual damages sustained by the
Shearers and the extent of Texas Insulator's misconduct. Accordingly, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court judgment. 75
In Holland Mortgage & Investment Corp. v. Bone 76 the Houston court of
appeals considered the applicability of the DTPA to a lender/mortgagee and
concluded that under proper circumstances a court should sustain liability.
The Bones sued the mortgagee, Holland Mortgage and Investment Corpora-
tion, and the seller-builder after their home flooded as a result of the im-
proper grading of the property. Following a jury trial, the court entered a
judgment in the sum of $33,000 against the builder and mortgage company,
jointly and severally, for breach of warranty, negligence, and DTPA viola-
tions. Holland Mortgage and Investment Corporation appealed the judg-
ment, alleging, among other things, that the Bones did not acquire goods or
services from the mortgage company and were, therefore, not consumers
77
entitled to bring a DTPA action. 7
8
71. The jury found the actual damages to be $36,288.00.
72. 739 S.W.2d at 480 (citing Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 725 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex.
1987); Alamo Nat. Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981)).
73. Id. at 479 (citing Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex. 1984)).
74. Id. at 480. In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished Nabours v. Longview
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 700 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. 1985); and Doubleday & Co. v. Rogers, 674
S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. 1984) (punitive damages not sustained where plaintiff incurred no ac-
tual damages and did not seek equitable relief). Id. at 479-80.
75. Id. at 482. In its decision, the court also denied Texas Insulators' points of error
relative to the special issues submitted to the jury. Id.
76. 751 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, n.w.h.).
77. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987) defines a "consumer"
as "an individual ... who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services." The
term "goods means tangible chattels or real property purchased or leased for use." TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989). The DTPA defines "services" as "work,
labor, or service purchased or leased for use, including services furnished in connection with
the sale of repair of goods." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
78. 751 S.W.2d at 517. One must be a "consumer" to prevail on an action under the
DTPA, Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1985); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603
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In reaching its decision, the court of appeals considered the definition of
consumer in the context of a lending relationship. Existing case law indi-
cated that the DTPA did not apply to lenders when the borrower did not use
the borrowed funds for the lease or purchase of goods or services, because
the borrower in those circumstances did not qualify as a consumer. 79 Con-
versely, the DTPA did apply to lenders when the borrower earmarked the
borrowed funds for specific acquisitions,80 particularly when a relationship
exists between the lender and the provider of the goods or services. 81
In the instant case the Bones used the funds borrowed from Holland
Mortgage and Investment Corporation for the purchase of the home. In
addition, the evidence established that the builder recommended the mort-
gage company to the Bones and set up an interview for the mortgage loan
application. Moreover, the contract between the parties provided for an in-
spection of the property by the mortgage company. Under the foregoing
facts, the court determined that the Bones were consumers under the DTPA
vis a vis the Holland Mortgage and Investment Corporation. Notwithstand-
ing the applicability of the DTPA to the transaction, the appellate court
reversed the judgment as to the mortgage company based upon no evidence
points.8 2
III. EXEMPTIONS
In San Antonio Savings Association v. Komet (In re Komet )83 the bank-
ruptcy court examined the validity of the 1987 amendment to the Texas
Property Code exempting qualified pension and profit-sharing plans from
the reach of a creditor.84 Although the court subsequently withdrew the
Komet decision for reconsideration, its discussion of the issues in the case
warrants comments.
The Komets, relying on section 42.0021 of the Property Code claimed as
exempt their interests in a pension plan valued at $100,000 and a profit shar-
ing plan valued at $140,000.85 Their creditors challenged the exemptions
S.W.2d 169, 174-76 (Tex. 1980); and the "goods or services" acquired by the consumer must
give rise to the DTPA claim, Cameron v. Terrell & Garret, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex.
1981).
79. Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980) (refinancing of
automobile).
80. 751 S.W.2d at 518 (citing Knight v. Int'l Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 389
(Tex. 1982) (purchase of truck); and Fleniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705,
707 (Tex. 1983) (purchase of home)).
81. 751 S.W.2d at 518 (citing Wynn v. Kensington, 697 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. App.-Austin
1985, no writ)).
82. 751 S.W.2d at 521. The court said the evidence did not show that Holland Mortgage
and Investment Corporation misled the Bones about the quality of the house. Furthermore,
the Bones failed to present expert testimony about the value of the home at the time they
purchased it. Id. at 520-21.
83. Ch. 11, Case No. 88-50379-C, (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 1988).
84. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
85. That section exempts, in addition to the eligible personal property set forth in sections
42.001 and 42.002:
a person's right to the assets held in ... a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing,
annuity, or similar plan or contract, including a retirement plan for self-em-
[Vol. 43
CREDITOR AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
and asserted in a case of first impression that only one of the plans could be
exempt under a strict reading of the statute.86
The bankruptcy court in Komet disregarded the arguments of both the
debtors and the objecting creditors and ruled that neither plan was exempt
because the Federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)8 7 preempts the Texas statutory exemption. In reaching this deci-
sion, the court focused its inquiry on whether the Texas exemption88 "relates
to an ERISA plan" according to recent United States Supreme Court guide-
lines.89 The bankruptcy court concluded that, by virtue of the reference to
the qualifying sections of the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA in section
42.0021 of the Texas Property Code, the exemption relates to an ERISA
plan. Accordingly, the Komet court found that the federal law preempted
the statute and denied the debtors' claimed exemption relative to the pension
plan and the profit sharing plan. 90
Subsequent to the Komet decision, an Arizona bankruptcy court in Penick
v. Hirsch (In re Hirsh)91 considered a challenge to the debtors' claimed ex-
emption of ERISA-qualified retirement funds under Arizona law92 based
upon the same federal preemption provision93 and Supreme Court precedent
cited in Komet. 94 In addition, the Hirsh court addressed the debtor's asser-
tion of federalization of state exemptions as a defense to preemption. 95
In Hirsh the debtors alleged that section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code au-
thorized them to assert exemptions under the law of the state of their domi-
cile96 thereby "federalizing" the Arizona statute and exception its exemption
of ERISA-qualified plans from preemption. The Hirsh court first established
that because the United States Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the
ployed individuals ...unless the plan, contract, or account does not qualify
under the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ...
[A]ssets . . .under a government or church plan or contract are also exempt
unless the plan or contract does not qualify ... under [ERISA].
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
86. The Taxation Section of the State Bar of Texas has proposed legislation that would
exempt all qualified plans. STATE BAR OF TEXAS PROPOSED LEGISLATION RELATING TO
EXEMPTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM SEIZURE AMENDING TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 42.0021(a) (1988).
87. ERISA § 514(a) provides that federal law "shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [covered by this
statute]." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
88. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
89. "A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has
a connection with or reference to such a plan" Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv.,
108 S. Ct. 2182, 2185 (1978) (citation omitted) (emphasis original). The Court also said: "The
pre-emption provision [of 514(a)] displaces all state laws that fall within its sphere, even in-
cluding state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements. Id. (quoting
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
90. Id., slip op at 5; see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). The validity of the decision is in
question since the court has withdrawn the decisions for reconsideration.
91. Ch. II Case No. B-876193, Adv. No. 88-44 (Bankr. Ariz. Dec. 15, 1988).
92. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1126(B) (West Supp. 1988).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
94. 108 S. Ct. at 2185.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) provides that ERISA shall not preempt other federal law.
96. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (1982).
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ERISA preemption provision, the federal statute would supersede the Ari-
zona exemption statute in a state court proceeding. 97 The Hirsh court then
held that a different result was not warranted in the context of a bankruptcy
case, notwithstanding the incorporation of state exemption law in section
522 of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the court denied the debtors'
claimed exemptions as to the pension plans. 98
In Brooks v. Interfirst Bank, Fort Worth (In re Brooks)99 the creditor's
challenge to the debtor's claimed exclusion of a pension/profit-sharing plan
from the bankruptcy estate arose prior to the effective date of the state ex-
emption of qualified retirement plans. 100 In Brooks the debtor was a radiolo-
gist practicing as part of a professional association comprised of thirty-two
doctors that had established a retirement plan for its members. At the time
of the bankruptcy petition, Dr. Brooks' vested interest in the plan was in
excess of $500,000.
In his bankruptcy proceeding, Dr. Brooks asserted that the plan was ex-
cluded from the bankruptcy estate, since the plan qualified as a spendthrift
trust under Texas law. 10 ' Both the United States Bankruptcy Court 10 2 and
the United States District Court rejected Dr. Brooks' position on the
grounds that his membership in the professional association rendered the
plan "self settled" and unenforceable as a spendthrift trust under Texas
law. 103
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Dr. Brooks argued that
by virtue of its size and structure, his professional association was analogous
to a disinterested employer that may create an enforceable spendthrift trust
for the benefit of its employees."°4 The court of appeals, however, rejected
the argument ruling that partial ownership of the professional association
rendered each of the thirty-two doctors a settlor of the trust. Thus, under
97. "State laws which are 'specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans' are pre-
empted under [ERISA]." 108 S. Ct. at 2185 (citations omitted). That a state law may "effec-
tuate ERISA's underlying purposes... is not enough to save the state law from pre-emption."
Id.
98. Ch. 11 Case No. B-876193, Adv. No. 88-44, slip op. at 3; cf Small Business Admin. v.
Bubert, (In re Bubert), 61 Bankr. 362, 363-64 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986), aff'd, 809 F.2d 259
(5th Cir. 1987) (state exemption statute is federal law for purposes of determining what prop-
erty is property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541 and what property is exempt
under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)).
99. 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988).
100. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982) excludes property from the estate to the extent it is sub-ject to a "restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." This section has been interpreted to shield
spendthrift trusts that are valid under state law. See In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 582 (5th Cir.
1983) (Keough Plan established by debtors for their own benefit was not a valid spendthrift
trust and therefore was included in bankruptcy estate).
102. 60 Bankr. 155 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
103. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035 (Vernon 1984) states: "If the settlor is also a bene-
ficiary of the trust, a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his benefi-
cial interest does not prevent his creditors from satisfying claims from his interest in the trust
estate."
104. See, Hines v. Sands, 312 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, no writ); see
also In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 582.
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Texas law, the plan's antialienation provision was unenforceable 10 5 and the
plan was included in the bankruptcy estate. 1°6 Accordingly, the court af-
firmed the judgment of the lower court. 10 7
In In re William Michael Brothers 10 8 the bankruptcy court held that the
cash surrender value of two life insurance policies was not exempt from the
bankruptcy estate under a recent amendment to the Texas Insurance
Code.'0 9 The amendment exempts payments made under a life, health or
accident insurance policy. 110 The bankruptcy court noted that the payments
exempt under the Insurance Code are apparently in addition to and apart
from the property exempt under the Property Code."'I
In Brothers the trustee of the debtor's bankruptcy estate challenged the
exempt status of two insurance policies with an aggregate cash surrender
value of approximately twelve thousand dollars because the value of the
debtor's property would then exceed the thirty thousand dollar personal
property limitation under the Property Code. 1 2 The debtor asserted that
the policies were protected by the Insurance Code exemption without regard
to value, and that the amendment to the Insurance Code impliedly repealed
the provisions of the Property Code addressing cash surrender values. 13
Based on the language of the statute and the applicable legislative history,
the bankruptcy court concluded that the amendment to article 21.22(1) of
the Insurance Code neither explicitly nor impliedly repealed section
42.002(7) of the Property Code with respect to the exemption of cash surren-
der values. 114 Moreover, the court found that the only payments under a life
insurance policy qualifying for the Insurance Code exemption are those paid
to the beneficiary upon the death of the insured. 1 5 Accordingly, the court
held that the cash surrender value of the insurance policies was exempt, if at
all, as eligible personal property subject to the thirty thousand dollar maxi-
mum limitation under the Property Code." 16
In In re Reed 117 the bankruptcy court considered the extent to which
105. 155 Bankr. at 160, see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035 (Vernon 1984).
106. 155 Bankr. at 160; see 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982).
107. 155 Bankr. at 160.
108. 94 Bankr. 82 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
109. Id. at 85-86.
110. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989). Prior to the amendment,
insurance benefits were exempted only if payable on a weekly, monthly or other installment
basis. Exemption of Insurance Benefits from Seizure Under Process, Ch. 491, art. 21.22 1951
Tex. Gen. Laws 868, 1076 amended by Exemptions of Insurance Benefits From Seizure Under
Process, Ch. 5, art. 21.22 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 22,22.
111. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001-.004 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1989). 94 Bankr. at 84
(citing Teofan & O'Neill, supra note 49, at 215).
112. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 1984). Subject to certain conditions, the
cash surrender value of life insurance policies is specifically included in eligible personal prop-
erty exempt under the Property Code, subject to the $30,000.00 maximum limitation. TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001, .002(7) (Vernon 1984).
113. 94 Bankr. at 83 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(7) (Vernon 1984).
114. Id. at 85.
115. Id. (interpreting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989)).
116. Id. at 85-86. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001, .002(7) (Vernon 1984).
117. 89 Bankr. 603 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
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jewelry is exempt from seizure by creditors. Following a protracted divorce
and conversion action against her ex-husband, Mrs. Reed's former attorneys
obtained a writ of garnishment against certain jewelry that had been placed
in a lock box under the joint control of the Reeds' attorneys pending resolu-
tion of the consolidated divorce and conversion action.' 18
In Mrs. Reed's ensuing bankruptcy proceeding, the attorneys asserted a
security interest in the jewelry and filed a motion for relief from the auto-
matic stay" 9 to garnish the jewelry in partial satisfaction of their claim.
Mrs. Reed objected to the attorneys' claim and opposed the motion, assert-
ing, among other things, that the property was not subject to execution, and
thus the writ of garnishment was invalid.' 20
The bankruptcy court in Reed noted that prior to the codification of the
Property Code, jewelry was deemed to be "wearing apparel" exempt under
the former, exemption statute.' 2' When the legislature codified the exemp-
tions, however, it amended the statute to exempt "clothing" rather than
"wearing apparel."' 22 In determining whether jewelry is exempt under cur-
rent Texas law, the Reed court considered whether the legislature in making
the change in the statutory language intended to limit the scope of the ex-
emption or to modernize the statute. After reviewing applicable legislative
history 23 and noting contrary authority, 24 the court concluded that the
legislature did not intend to make a substantive change in the law and that
jewelry could be exempted as clothing.
The Reed court limited the exemption for jewelry, however, by reference
to the "reasonably necessary" standard set forth in section 42.002(3) of the
Property Code. 125 The court established a liberal definition of "necessary"
to include those items that an objective person would deem "usual and ap-
propriate for the reasonable comfort and convenience of the debtor.' 26
Under the foregoing analysis, the court in Reed upheld the debtor's exemp-
118. The jewelry included Mrs. Reed's wedding band and ring guards and was valued at
approximately $8,700.00. In the final judgment of divorce in the state court action (Cause No.
86-6691-R, 254th District, Dallas, Texas, issued Jan. 14, 1987), Mrs. Reed was awarded the
jewelry.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
120. Mrs. Reed also argued that the property was held in custodia legis pending resolution
of the divorce and conversion action and was protected from garnishment as if held by the
registry of the court; the court concurred and invalidated the writ of garnishment. 89 Bankr.
at 608.
121. 89 Bankr. at 605 (citations omitted); see Property Exempt From Forced Sales, Ch.
915, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 384, 385, repealed by Exemptions-Forced Sale, Ch. 588, § 4,
1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1627, 1628.
122. Compare TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(3)(c) (Vernon 1984) with Property Ex-
empt from Sale, Ch. 145, § 1, 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws 384, 385 (repealed 1973).
123. 89 Bankr. at 606 (citing Nonsubstantive Revisions to the Property Code, 1983: Hearing
on Senate Bill 748 Before the Senate Finance Committee (April 1983) (statement of Senator
Sam Kitret)).
124. Id. (citing Fernandez v. Seidler (In re Fernandez), 89 Bankr. 601, 602-3 (W.D. Tex.
1988) (jewelry not exempt)).
125. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(3) (Vernon 1984).
126. 89 Bankr. 607 (citing In re Millington's Estate, 63 Cal.' App. 498, 499, 218 P. 1022,
1023 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923)). The court distinguished jewelry purchased for investment or
show from jewelry of sentimental value or useful purpose.
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tion claim for the rings, ring guards, and pins worn by the debtor on a regu-
lar basis. 127
The Family Law Section of the State Bar of Texas has proposed an
amendment to the Property Code 128 to the 1989 Texas Legislature, deleting
the "reasonably necessary" requirement of section 42.002(3), thus, allowing
an exemption for all eligible personal property up to the aggregate limit
without regard to necessity. In addition, if the legislature adopts the amend-
ment, it would replace the term "clothing" presently contained in section
42.002(3)(c) with the term "wearing apparel (including jewelry)." The bill
attempts to clarify, among other things, that: (1) the computation of the
aggregate personal property exemption includes only the debtor's equity in
personal property; 129 and (2) that the calculation of the aggregate personal
property exemption also excludes current wages, health aids, and funds
otherwise exempt from seizure. The proposed amendment also suggests a
procedure for designation of exempt property when eligible personal prop-
erty exceeds the aggregate personal property exemption.' 30
The legislative proposal also seeks to enable Texas debtors to avoid non-
possessory, nonpurchase money liens on exempt personal property.' 13  This
provision has the effect of overruling current case law applicable to debtors
in bankruptcy who choose the Texas rather than federal exemption alterna-
tive. 132 Finally, the amendment would reduce the statute of limitations for
creditors' actions from four years to two years to avoid fraudulent convey-
ances of nonexempt to exempt property.133
127. Id.
128. STATE BAR OF TEXAS PROPOSED LEGISLATION RELATING TO INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY EXEMPT FROM CREDITOR'S CLAIMS AMENDING TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 42.001 to .004 (1988) [hereinafter State Bar Proposed Legislation].
129. Cf. Barnett v. United States (In re Barnett), 33 Bankr. 70 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983)
(exemption calculated fair market value).
130. State Bar Proposed Legislation, supra note 128, at 3.
131. Id. at 1.
132. See I1 U.S.C. § 522(b), (d), (f); Bessent v. United States (In re Bessent), 831 F.2d 82
(5th Cir. 1987); Allen v. Hale County State Bank (In re Allen), 725 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1984);
(debtors choosing Texas exemptions may not utilize § 522(f) to avoid nonpossessory, nonpur-
chase money liens on exempt property).
133. State Bar Proposed Legislation, supra note 128, at 3-4.
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